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FORECASTS 1983
Roy H. Webb
The views and opinions in this article regarding
future economic activity are those of the various
forecasters. No agreement or endorsement by this
Bank is implied.
The longest recession since World War II will
have ended by the time you read this article, ac-
cording to a group of economic forecasters. While
record-breaking prosperity may not be right around
the corner, the forecasters do expect moderate real
economic growth in 1983 led by strong consumer
spending and a rebound in residential construction.
It should be noted, however, that forecasters also
expected moderate real economic growth for 1982
at this time last year.
This article contains highlights of a recent survey
of economic forecasts. First, the pattern of forecasts
for 1983 is discussed, with details presented in Tables
I and II. (Considerably more information is avail-
able in this Bank’s “Business Forecasts 1983,” which
is a compilation of forecasts with names and details
of the various estimates.) Next is a discussion of
last year’s predictions. An analysis of forecasts over
the last twelve years concludes the article.
Table I
RESULTS FOR 1982 AND TYPICAL FORECAST FOR 1983
* Data available as of January 1983.
** These data are constructed using preliminary 1982 data and the median annual percentage change forecast for each category,
incorporating 31 forecasts.
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Real GNP is projected to increase by 3.9 percent
over the year (unless otherwise noted, growth-rates
are from the fourth quarter of 1982 to the fourth
quarter of 1983 as shown in Table II). That real
growth would represent a considerable improvement
over the last three years: real GNP declined 0.7
percent in 1980, grew only 0.7 percent in 1981 and
fell 1.2 percent in 1982. Even if the predicted growth
were to occur, however, at the end of 1983 the
economy would still be well below its historical po-
tential. For example, unemployment would be 9.7
percent of the labor force compared with 6.0 percent
in late 1979. Likewise, housing starts, at 1.6 million
in 1978. And the industrial production index would
still be 5 percent below its level in early 1979.
The household sector is expected to provide the
strongest growth in spending in 1983. Consumer
spending for durable goods is expected to rise by 14
percent, while private housing starts are expected to
increase by 334,000 units. Business nonresidential
fixed investment, however, is expected to show little
real growth.
No dramatic change in the inflation picture is
expected. The consumer price index, for example,
is projected to grow by 5.3 percent in 1983, com-
pared to 4.5 percent in 1982.
Table II
TYPICAL QUARTERLY CHANGES FORECAST FOR 1983
* Percentage changes at annual rates unless otherwise noted. Median quarterly percentage change for each category, incorporating
20 forecasts. Due in port to the smaller sample size in this table, these data ore not strictly comparable to the median percentage
changes forecast for the year 1983 in the preceding table.
a Percentage change, except cumulative change in the levels of inventories
ployment rote.
b Billions of dollars at annual rates.
c Percent.
d Average computed from quarterly figures.
and exports, and change in the quarterly average unem-
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In many ways the 1983 forecast described above
resembles the median forecast for 1982 described in
“Forecasts 1982.” Both projected a consumer-led
recovery with moderate real GNP growth. The 1983
forecast for 3.9 percent growth in real GNP is not
far from the 2.8 percent projected for 1982. Actually,
real GNP in 1982 declined by 1.2 percent as the
recession lingered much longer than anticipated.
Another point of similarity is that both the 1983
and the 1982 forecasts projected little change in the
inflation rate. In 1983, the inflation rate (estimated
by the producer price index) is predicted to rise by
1.3 percentage points, while last year it was predicted
to rise by 0.5 percentage points. The rate actually
declined in 1982 by 3.6 percentage points. As was
noted in this article last year, forecasters typically
underpredict changes in inflation rates. Most often,
formal econometric models rely heavily on past infla-
tion rates to predict future inflation (see, for ex-
ample, Eckstein [1982] for an explanation of the
reasoning behind such an approach). As a result,
even when monetary policy changes as dramatically
as it did in 1981 (when shift-adjusted Ml grew by
2.3 percent, down sharply from 6.6 percent growth in
1980) many forecasters will predict little change in
near-term inflation rates.
The 1982 forecasts can also be compared with
forecasts in recent years. As Table III indicates,
the 1982 forecast errors were above average for real
output growth, inflation, and the interest rate on
Treasury bills. After such a difficult year to predict,
one might wonder how much confidence should be
placed in forecasts for 1983. To determine that, a
more detailed analysis of past forecasts is presented
below.
An Analysis of Past Forecasts
The purpose of this section is to study the record
of median forecasts in an attempt to gauge the reli-
ability of future forecasts.
1 In order to do that, simple
statistical analysis is used. The price of that sim-
plicity is the adoption of stringent assumptions.
2 If
1 At this point it is useful to examine the comparability of
the median with individual forecasts. Over the 1971-82
period there were three individual forecasters for whom
this Bank published real GNP and inflation projections
for each year. ‘Their average errors were 1.5, 1.8, and 2.3
percent for inflation, versus 1.7 percent for the median
forecast. For real GNP, their average errors were 1.2,
1.2, and 1.4 percent, versus 1.7 percent for the median.
Thus while it is hard to draw firm conclusions based on
three observations, it appears that the median forecast
had about average accuracy in predicting inflation but
below-average accuracy in predicting real GNP.
2 It is assumed that when a forecast is prepared, the
median forecast error for each year is an independent,
normally distributed random variable with a zero mean
and fixed variance that remains unchanged over time. In
addition, it is assumed that the small sample sizes (twelve
forecasts for GNP and inflation, and nine interest-rate
forecasts) are large enough to provide useful information.
Table III
THE RECORD OF MEDIAN FORECASTS
Note: Predictions ore from Business Forecasts, published annually by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. The error is the absolute
value of the difference between predicted and actual values. Real growth and inflation ore from the fourth quarter of the previous
year to the fourth quarter of the stated year. The Treasury bill rote is the average value of three-month bills in the fourth quarter.
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conclusions can be drawn.
First, the forecasts miss a large portion of the
variation in future economic conditions. To see this,
consider the regressions presented in Table IV of
actual outcomes versus predictions for real GNP
growth, the inflation rate and the Treasury bill rate.
In each case the summary. statistic R
2 can be inter-
preted as the fraction of the variation in actual out-
comes that is associated with variation in the forecast.
For real GNP, a little more than half of the vari-
ation in actual growth was associated with the fore-
casts. But for inflation the corresponding value was
less than one-third, and for the interest rate only one-
fourth. That is, the median forecast failed to predict
most of the variation in inflation and the interest
rate. Thus over the sample period, the majority of
the shocks to the economy that moved inflation and
interest rates were not predicted. That result, in
turn, raises doubts about the reliability of current
and future forecasts.
A second conclusion is that forecasters often place
an undue weight on recent conditions when predict-
ing future inflation and interest rates. To see this,
consider the R
2 statistics from regressions of fore-
casts for a given year on the previous year’s actual
outcome (also presented in Table IV). For both
inflation and the interest rate it is clear that most of
the variation of forecasts was associated with the
previous year’s experience. Predictions of real GNP,
on the other hand, had a relatively small amount of
forecast variation associated with recent outcomes.
Another way to illustrate forecast accuracy is to
present confidence intervals for the 1983 forecasts
based on the regressions mentioned above. If the
assumptions given in footnote one are satisfied, then
one can compute the distribution of future forecast
errors and derive probabilities that forecasts will be
within certain limits (often referred to as confidence
intervals).
3 For each variable, a symmetric interval
around the median forecast will be-presented so that
the odds are three to one that the actual outcome is
within that interval. (In other words, a 75 percent
confidence interval is presented.) The width of that
interval illustrates the precision of the forecast.
For real GNP growth, the 75 percent confidence
interval is 1.1 to 6.7 percent. The inflation forecast
has a confidence interval ranging from 3.0 to 7.8
percent. And the confidence interval for the interest
rate is widest of all, 4.9 to 12.4 percent. It should be
remembered that actual outcomes will be outside
even such wide intervals about one-fourth of the time.
The foregoing analysis indicates that forecasts have
been imperfect guides to the future. That is not to
say that forecasts are useless. On the contrary, when
an individual forecaster constructs a model of eco-
nomic activity, predictions of numerous variables can
be made consistent with each other, which is a valu-
able achievement. In addition, a nontrivial fraction
of future movement can often be predicted, as the
median real GNP forecast demonstrates. Nonethe-
less, considerable uncertainty remains and is illus-
trated in the wide confidence intervals described
above. Whenever economic forecasts play a signifi-
cant role in decision-making, that uncertainty is
ignored at the, user’s peril.
3 See Kmenta [1971] for a discussion of forecast errors
and confidence intervals.
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Independent Variable Dependent Variable
Actual GNP growth
Actual inflation
Actual Treasury bill rate
Predicted GNP growth
Predicted inflation
Predicted Treasury bill rate
Predicted GNP Growth .52
Predicted inflation .30
Predicted Treasury bill rate .25
Actual GNP growth last year .19
Actual inflation last year .69
Actual Treasury bill rate last year .85
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